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Why	did	the	Conservatives’	large	lead	in	vote	shares
produce	only	an	80-seat	majority?
Plurality	rule	voting	systems	have	a	well-known	tendency	to	exaggerate	the	seats	of	the	largest
party.	A	full	analysis	of	the	2019	results	remains	to	be	completed,	but	Tim	Smith	finds	evidence
that	this	time	around	the	Conservatives	had	a	modest	23	seat	advantage	over	Labour	in	terms	of
two-party	bias.	The	‘leader’s	bias’	advantage	was	also	much	smaller	than	that	which	Labour
enjoyed	in	1997-2005.	This	may	mean	that	the	future	boundary	reforms	to	equalize	constituency
sizes	may	not	be	as	beneficial	as	the	Conservatives	hope.
Conservative	politicians	have	long	complained	that	they	have	been	fighting	the	Labour	party	on	an	uneven	pitch.
Their	case	has	been	that	Labour	MPs	have	been	elected	in	constituencies	with	smaller	electorates	than	those	in
Conservative	seats.	The	2019	manifesto	is	the	fourth	Tory	manifesto	in	a	row	to	promise	legislation	to	equalize	the
sizes	of	constituencies	by	implementing	boundary	reforms	on	a	strict	population	basis.	Once	implemented,	the
pledge	means	that	in	future	constituency	sizes	will	not	vary	more	than	5%	from	the	UK	quota	(national	average),
with	every	set	of	boundaries	reviewed	every	five	years.	The	boundaries	used	in	the	2019	election	are	now	almost
twenty	years	out	of	date.	The	electoral	statistics	used	to	draw	them	up	derive	from	December	2000.
Some	Conservative	commentators	have	also	noted	that	despite	being	just	under	12	percentage	points	ahead	of
Labour	in	national	vote	share,	Boris	Johnson	none	the	less	gained	a	smaller	majority	of	80	seats	in	the	Commons
than	when	Labour	won	a	majority	of	165	in	2001	with	just	over	a	9%	lead.	Table	1	below	shows	that	Labour’s	two-
party	lead	in	2005	was	under	3%,	but	it	yet	produced	a	two-party	seats	lead	of	158	and	an	overall	majority	of	66.	In
2019,	the	Tory	lead	was	four	times	larger,	but	the	two-party	seats	lead	was	almost	the	same	as	in	2005,	and
Johnson’s	overall	Commons	majority	is	80	seats.
The	classic	means	of	measuring	two-party	bias	in	a	plurality	rule	(‘first	past	the	post’)	system,	is	using	Brookes’
decomposition	method,	as	adapted	by	Johnston,	Rossiter	and	Pattie,	and	also	explained	here.	Everyone	accepts
that	plurality	rule	benefits	the	larger	parties,	especially	the	winning	party,	at	the	expense	of	the	smaller	parties	with
widely	spread	support.	The	Brookes	method	has	a	more	limited	purpose,	namely	to	check	how	level	the	playing
field	is	between	the	top	two	parties.	By	adjusting	the	vote	shares	on	a	uniform	basis	to	an	equal	level,	one	finds	the
Conservatives	23	seats	ahead	of	Labour,	which	constitutes	the	total	bias.	The	various	components	that	go	make	up
the	overall	bias	can	be	derived	algebraically	using	the	Brookes	method	from	this	point.
British Politics and Policy at LSE: Why did the Conservatives’ large lead in vote shares produce only an 80-seat majority? Page 1 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2020-01-15
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/ge2019-bias/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/
Table	2	below	shows	that	total	bias	in	the	system	has	been	in	the	Conservatives’	favour	since	the	2015	election,
when	it	peaked	at	a	49	seat	lead	advantage.	Since	then	it	dropped	to	12	seats	in	2017	(when	Labour	almost
matched	Tory	support).	In	the	2019	election	the	Conservatives	were	well	ahead	in	terms	of	votes,	but	the	overall
seats	advantage	they	enjoyed	rose	only	slightly	to	reach	23	at	this	election.
Sources:	Data	for	1987	to	2010	are	drawn	from	here	and	here.	Data	for	2015-19	are	the	author’s	calculations.
Notes:	The	cell	entries	show	the	consequences	of	bias	in	terms	of	two-party	seat	leads,	i.e.	multiplying	each	seat	by
2.	Positive	numbers	show	a	pro-Tory	bias,	and	negative	numbers	a	pro-Labour	bias.	Notice	that	the	2019	overall
bias	is	much	smaller	than	the	leader’s	bias	Labour	enjoyed	in	the	three	elections	it	won	from	1997	to	2005.	Indeed,
Labour	had	a	larger	two-party	bias	in	its	favour	in	2010,	an	election	that	it	lost,	than	the	Conservative	gained	in
2019	despite	being	streets	ahead	in	voter	terms.
Looking	at	the	different	components	shown	in	Table	2	helps	to	explains	why	the	very	large	lead	the	Conservatives
received	in	terms	of	vote	share	did	not	translate	into	the	kind	of	majority	that	Labour	managed	in	1997	and	2001.
The	size	differentials	between	constituencies	remains	an	issue,	giving	a	Labour	advantage	over	the	Conservatives
of	18	seats.	Eight	seats	of	this	come	from	the	differential	between	the	three	nations,	England,	Scotland,	and	Wales.
Whilst	Scotland’s	representation	was	reduced	closer	to	English	levels	in	2005	after	devolution,	there	is	a
considerable	malapportionment	in	the	system	favouring	Wales.	If	constituency	sizes	were	equalized	in	Wales,	then
the	country	would	overwhelmingly	elect	Labour	MPs	on	the	basis	of	equal	vote	shares.	This	effect	is	currently
constrained	because	Wales	has	much	smaller	constituency	sizes	than	England,	58,000	to	74,900.
The	other	ten	seats	due	to	differentials	in	constituency	sizes	arise	within	a	country,	mainly	within	England.	The
Conservatives	have	tended	to	favour	regular	boundary	reviews	because	in	the	past	this	seat	bias	in	favour	of
Labour	has	grown	between	such	reviews	–	inner	city	seats	have	tended	to	shrink	whilst	suburbs	and	rural	seats
have	seen	their	electorates	grow.	However,	this	effect	has	not	been	the	case	this	cycle.	The	size	bias	is	exactly	the
same	in	2019	as	it	was	in	2010	when	the	current	boundaries	were	first	used.	On	the	basis	of	actual	voting	shares
(rather	than	the	equal	ones	assumed	by	the	Brookes	method),	the	size	bias	has	actually	dropped	since	2015,	as
the	Conservatives	have	gained	more	support	in	territory	with	declining	electorate	sizes	such	as	Stoke.
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Differentials	in	turnout,	or	more	properly	lack	of	turnout,	have	had	a	greater	impact	on	the	two-party	bias	than
differentials	in	constituency	sizes.	Throughout	the	period	shown	in	Table	2,	there	has	been	a	lower	turnout	in	seats
that	are	more	Labour-inclined	on	average	than	those	that	are	more	Conservative-inclined	on	average.	This	effect
peaked	in	2001	and	2005	at	a	38-seat	bias	to	Labour	and	it	has	been	20	to	24	in	the	last	three	elections,	larger
than	the	impact	of	constituency	size	differentials.	The	average	turnout	in	seats	more	Labour	than	the	national
average	was	65.3%,	compared	to	69.3%	in	those	seats	more	Conservative.	Boundary	changes	will	not	assist	the
Conservatives	here.
The	‘third	party’	effects	in	Table	2	come	from	the	minor	parties	either	piling	up	‘wasted’	votes	in	seats	where	they
cannot	win,	or	winning	seats,	in	areas	which	are	differentially	more	Conservative	or	more	Labour.	The	net	effects
here	have	tended	to	favour	Labour,	with	the	Liberal	Democrats	historically	winning	more	seats	in	areas	which	were
more	Conservative	than	Labour.	However,	after	the	Liberal	Democrats’	big	losses	in	2015,	and	the	SNP’s	big	gains
in	Scotland	at	that	election,	the	third-party	effect	has	moved	towards	benefiting	the	Conservatives,	albeit	only
slightly.	As	John	Curtice,	has	pointed	out	or	here,	this	larger	wedge	of	third	party	seats	means	that	there	is	now	a
bigger	landing	zone	for	the	UK’s	voting	system	to	produce	hung	Parliament	outcomes,	as	it	did	in	2010	and	2017.
The	main	component	in	the	system	for	the	last	three	elections	that	has	cancelled	out	the	Labour	advantage	in	terms
of	size	and	turnout,	has	been	the	Conservatives	having	a	considerably	more	efficiently	distributed	vote.	This	comes
from	Tory	votes	being	located	in	the	right	places	across	the	country,	so	minimizing	‘wasted	surplus’	votes	from
piling	up	huge	majorities	in	safe	constituencies,	and	also	minimizing	‘redundant	votes’,	in	seats	where	the	party
does	not	win.	There	was	a	big	bias	in	Labour’s	favour	in	2005.	The	Conservatives	have	done	well	to	turn	this
around	to	a	bias	in	their	favour	of	55	seats	over	Labour	in	2015.	However,	at	the	last	two	elections	they	have	not
been	able	to	match	the	kind	of	advantage	that	Labour	had	in	2001	(74).	The	pro-Tory	efficiency	bias	stood	at	27	in
2017	and	46	seats	in	2019.	During	the	‘New	Labour’	era	in	2001	and	2005,	Labour	made	the	most	of	local
incumbency	advantages	and	the	party	ruthlessly	targeted	and	held	onto	marginal	seats.
Some	consequences
The	Conservatives	cannot	necessarily	assume	that	changing	constituency	boundaries	on	a	stricter	or	more	regular
basis	will	help	them	buttress	their	majority	as	much	as	many	appear	to	hope,	or	indeed	as	feared	by	some	of	the
left.		The	much	cited	estimates	that	give	the	Tories	a	notional	majority	of	104	on	‘new’	boundaries	are	based	on
numbers	for	the	2018	review	that	was	never	implemented.	That	scheme	is	now	unlikely	to	be	put	into	action	without
significant	change,	since	the	electoral	numbers	on	which	it	was	based	are	now	themselves	dated	(deriving	from
December	2015).		Removing	a	more	realistic	two-thirds	of	the	size	bias	would	increase	the	current	Tory	majority	a
little	bit,	to	92	seats.	But	recent	voting	patterns	also	appear	to	be	changing	towards	the	Conservative	Party	doing
better	in	northern	towns.	If	so,	then	the	strategy	of	putting	though	a	strict	boundary	review	every	five	years	may	not
yield	the	kinds	of	gains	that	Tory	party	elites	expect.
Both	parties	also	appear	to	be	looking	at	reforming	the	franchise	in	order	to	tilt	the	electorate	in	their	favour.	Labour
has	been	proposing	lowering	the	voting	age	to	16	and	giving	the	vote	at	General	Elections	to	EU	citizens,	on	the
grounds	that	Commonwealth	citizens	already	have	this	right.	Surprisingly,	the	Conservatives	have	not	moved	to
close	off	this	unreciprocated	anomaly,	especially	since	it	enfranchises	large	numbers	of	overseas	students,	who	are
eligible	to	vote	immediately	at	general	elections	on	arrival	to	the	UK.	These	additional	student	votes	almost	certainly
cost	the	Tories	several	university	town	constituencies,	such	as	Canterbury	and	Warwick.
_________________
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